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ARGUMENT 
I. THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE 
WHERE COOPER DID NOT KNOWINGLY OR INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
Relying on Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 194 P.3d 903, the State asserts that Cooper, 
acting pro se, is "held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified 
member of the bar ..." Id. at ^ 11. Holding Cooper to this legal standard, the State next 
asserts that Cooper committed "invited error" when he "led the trial court into 
committing the error" of giving Jury Instruction #34. See Aple. Br. at 12-13. The State 
finally asserts that because Cooper failed to object to Jury Instruction #34, this Court is 
precluded from considering the issue, no matter the seriousness of the constitutional 
violation. See Aple. Br. at 14-15. * See Aple. Br. at 14-15. 
The State fails to acknowledge, however, that Allen v. Friel was a civil matter, not 
a criminal matter where personal freedom is at stake. Rather, in criminal trials, pro se 
defendants "should be accorded every consideration that may be reasonably indulged." 
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 19, 128 P.3d 1171. Moreover, the State ignores that a pro 
se defendant cannot waive his right to a trial by jury unless and until the trial court makes 
a finding that the waiver is knowing and intelligent. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 
276,312(1930). 
Notably, the State does not challenge the fact that Jury Instruction #34 commands 
a directed verdict for the State. Neither does the State challenge the fact that Cooper did 
not knowingly or intelligently waive his right to have the jury determine the factual issue 
in Jury Instruction #34. The State also does not challenge the fact that Cooper's right to a 
trial by jury was not forfeited. Instead, the State asserts that this Court cannot consider 
this constitutional violation because of the "invited error doctrine." See Aple. Br. at 14-
15. The State's assertion is not correct. 
As set forth in the opening brief, Cooper's failure to object to Jury Instruction #34 
is tantamount to an unknowing and unintelligent waiver of his right to a trial by jury. See 
Aplt. Br. at 11-14. This violation of Cooper's constitutional right to a jury trial is a 
structural defect that requires a reversal. See Aplt. Br. at 16-19. The State does not 
address or even challenge Cooper's analysis of this structural defect. Accordingly, 
1
 This final assertion is based on a list of cases wherein the invited error doctrine was 
applied to instances wherein able trial counsel assured the trial court that there was no 
error in the proceedings. The lone exception is State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4. 
2 
reversal is appropriate. 
Even if the "invited error doctrine" precluded this Court from reversing on the 
grounds of structural error (which Cooper does not concede), the invited error doctrine is 
inapplicable in this case. 
To assert that a pro se defendant led the trial court into this error, when the jury 
instruction was crafted and proposed by an experienced prosecutor, wholly lacks good 
faith. Prosecutors have a duty to ensure a fair trial. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, % 
31, 992 P.2d 1028 ("Prosecutors have a duty to eschew all improper tactics" and while 
prosecutors " may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as 
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one). Judges also have a duty to 
ensure a fair trial. See State v. King, 2006 UT 3, \ 19, 131 P.3d 202. 
Though it is true that there are many instances where trial counsel will make 
calculated decisions not to object to certain matters, there is no evidence suggesting that 
Cooper made a calculated decision in hopes of leading the trial court into error by failing 
to object to Jury Instruction #34. 
Cooper was not even provided with the Jury Instructions 28 through 34 until the 
end of trial (R. 462: 289-91) . To assert that an untrained pro se defendant read through 
and comprehended these jury instructions, with all their legalese, in a few minutes, and 
The proposed jury instructions were filed on January 22, 2008 (R. 208). The certificate 
of mailing is unsigned, indicating it was not served on Cooper (R. 209). Even if these 
documents were mailed to Cooper at that time, there is no reason to believe Cooper 
would have received them before trial on January 23, 2008. 
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then made a decision not to object to Instruction #34 with the sole purpose of leading the 
trial court into error so that an appeal could be taken, is absurd. 
In State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, the Utah Supreme Court applied the invited error 
doctrine to a pro se defendant. However, the nature of the error in Winfield, if any, does 
not rise to the constitutional error in this case. For example, in Winfield, the claimed 
error was the trial court's failure to ask follow up voir dire questions of a single juror. Id. 
at ^ 6-7. Notably, the defendant requested that the trial court ask a jury member an 
additional voir dire question, and then the defendant passed the jury for cause, stating that 
he "absolutely" found that the jury panel was acceptable and the defendant declined to 
use any of his peremptory challenges, stating, "The defense concedes to the jury 
selection." Id. at^j 8. 
The Court found that the defendant's question and objections during voir dire, his 
affirmative statements, as well as the fact that he had previously represented himself 
before, and "appeared to have a reasonable knowledge of his rights and of trial 
procedure" "invited the trial court to proceed without further questioning of the panel..." 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^J 20-21. Accordingly, if there was any error, the defendant invited 
the error. 
This case is distinguishable from Winfield. First of all, there is no evidence that 
Cooper has any constructive legal experience commensurate with the defendant in 
Winfield.3 More importantly, the claimed error in Winfield, that the trial judge failed to 
A cursory review of the numerous pleadings filed in this case by Cooper reveals his lack 
of technical knowledge of law and procedure. 
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conduct adequate voir dire, is not a structural error such as the violation of Cooper's right 
to a trial by jury. In addition, it cannot be asserted in good faith that Cooper led the trial 
court into this error. 
To a person with legal training, to which there is no evidence that Cooper has any 
such training, Jury Instruction #34 clearly usurps the jury role, since it compels the 
finding that Cooper filed a wrongful lien. That this is plain and clear is beyond dispute, 
and should have been readily apparent to the trial court. Not surprisingly, the State does 
not attempt to dispute the fact that Jury Instruction #34 deprives the jury of its role of 
determining the facts. The State also does not attempt to dispute the fact that Jury 
Instruction #34 demands a guilty verdict on all counts for a wrongful lien. The State does 
not dispute this because to do so would be frivolous and lack good faith. 
Instead, the State requests that this Court ignore the important duties prosecutors 
and judges have in ensuring fair trials, and find that Cooper somehow pulled a fast one on 
the trial court and led the trial court down the path to issuing a directed verdict for the 
State, just so Cooper could serve jail time and then file an appeal. Such an assertion is 
nonsensical. 
If the State's position is correct, then no matter what error exists in the jury 
instructions, as long as the pro se defendant raises no objection to the instruction, then the 
pro se defendant is forever barred from raising any issue on appeal regarding the 
defective jury instructions. This is true even where the jury instruction directs a directed 
verdict for the State! 
The trial court plainly erred in when it issued a directed verdict for the State as to 
5 
whether the document filed was a wrongful lien. This error deprived Cooper of his right 
to atrial by jury. 
In addition, and as set forth in the opening brief, harmless error cannot apply 
because Cooper never enjoyed his right to a jury trial because the judge instructed the 
jury to find Cooper guilty. The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as 
Article I, Sec 12 of the Utah Constitution, require that the verdict be reversed. 
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTIONS OF FOUR SEPARATE COUNTS OF FILING A 
WRONGFUL LIEN 
The State asserts that the conviction for filing a wrongful lien as to Judge Davis' 
property was proper because Jury Instruction #34 instructed the jury that the document 
was a wrongful lien as to Judge Davis. See Aple. Br. at 19. Notably, the State ignores 
the fact that Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6) provides that the document must at least purport 
to "create a lien, notice of interest, or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property" and that the document filed by Cooper did not identify any real property owned 
by Judge Davis. See Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Instead, the State asserts that the invited error 
doctrine precludes this challenge on appeal. See Aple. Br. at 19. 
For the reasons set forth above in Point I, the State's position is incorrect. Cooper 
did not waive his right to have the jury determine this factual element, nor did Cooper 
lead the trial court into this error. For the reasons set forth in Cooper's opening brief, the 
conviction pertaining to Judge Davis should be reversed. See Aplt. Br. at 26-28. 
The State next asserts that Cooper's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-5(2) 
(2004) is incorrect, and that § 38-9-5(2) does not preclude a conviction of multiple 
6 
felonies where only one wrongful lien document is filed. See Aple. Br. at 20-21. 
Admittedly, Cooper's appellate counsel unintentionally misquoted the statute by adding 
the word "single" to § 38-9-5(2) on page 30.4 See Aplt. Br. at 30. 
However, Cooper stands by his interpretation of § 38-9-5(2). Before the words 
"third degree felony" in § 38-9-5(2) is the article "a". The article "a" denotes a single 
felony, not multiple felonies. In addition, the statute reads, "A person who intentionally 
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien...." Again, the article 
"a" precedes "wrongful lien." Thus, the act of recording "a" single document results in 
"a" single felony conviction. 
The Legislature's desire to protect the "lawful property interest in real property" 
does not authorize four separate convictions where only one document was filed. Again, 
if the Legislature intended multiple charges where multiple properties were encumbered 
by a single recorded document, then the Legislature merely had to include such language 
as, "Each encumbered property shall be a separate offense." 
The State's interpretation, that "a plain reading authorizes the State to prosecute 
on behalf of all affected owners, whether identified in a single recorded document as 
here, or in separately recorded documents," cannot be correct. For example, if a single 
wrongful lien is recorded on a property owned by ten people, even though the wrongful 
lien identified only one individual owner, then ten felony charges would be authorized 
since all ten owners would be "affected". A plain reading of the statute does not 
Counsel did not intentionally misquote the statute and apologizes for the careless 
mistake. The statute was, however, correctly quoted on page 29. See Aplt. Br. at 29. 
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authorize this result. Nor does the plain reading of the statute authorize more than one 
felony conviction in this case. 
In addition, because the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is 
no need to resort to Legislative intent. See Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 
P.2d 207, 210-11 (UtahApp. 1998). 
For these reasons, and the reasons in Cooper's opening brief, three of the four 
convictions should be reversed pursuant to the plain language of § 38-9-5(2). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the opening brief, Cooper asks 
this Court to reverse his convictions of four counts of filing a wrongful lien, third degree 
felonies, and to remand this matter for a new trial. In addition, Cooper requests that three 
of the four convictions be dismissed for insufficient evidence as set forth in Point II. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z / d a y of June, 2010. 
•F<s'rAaron P. Dodd 
Counsel for Appellant 
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